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ABSTRACT 
 This paper investigates the effect of displacement on workplace injury risk and earnings using Italian 
administrative data on work histories merged with data on individual job-related accidents. Compared to a 
control group of non-displaced workers selected with propensity score matching techniques, re-employed 
displaced workers are exposed to moderate earnings losses and experience approximately a 79% increase in 
workplace injuries. This sizeable reduction in the quality of non-pecuniary working conditions is driven by the 
transition to new occupations and the risk imposed by new work environments. 
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1 Introduction 
The costs of involuntary job displacement have been extensively documented in terms of 
post-displacement earnings losses, lower employment rates and negative health effects 
(Couch and Placzek, 2010; Browning and Heinesen, 2012). In contrast, non-pecuniary job 
attributes have received relatively little attention in the literature, although these amenities 
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might represent an equally important component of the compensation package in several 
European countries, including Italy, where wages are regulated by strict institutional rules.  
This paper is the first study to investigate the changes in workplace safety conditions 
after displacement together with standard outcomes, such as employment and wage 
dynamics. Toward this end, the Italian administrative “Work Histories Italian Panel” 
(WHIP, for the 1989-2003 period) database has been merged with individual workplace 
injury data on the same workers from the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority (INAIL, 
for the 1994-2003 period). The post-displacement outcomes of workers displaced in 1997 
due to firm closure are compared to those of a control group of similar non-displaced 
individuals by combining the use of propensity score matching techniques with a difference-
in-differences estimator (PSM-DID). This comparison reveals that in addition to moderate 
earnings losses, re-employed displaced workers experience approximately a 79% increase in 
workplace injuries. This effect on job safety is not transitory and cannot be fully explained 
by lower experience in the new jobs. Indeed, our results indicate that displaced workers are 
re-employed in occupations that are riskier on average. 
The empirical finding that ignoring non-pecuniary losses understates the effects of job 
displacement is consistent with the theory of equalising differences (Rosen, 1974). If job 
safety is a normal good and job displacement generates a negative shock to workers’ 
earnings potential (i.e., to human capital or other kind of rents), laid-off workers might 
reasonably be expected to trade-off part of their job safety to reduce their wage losses. 
Indeed, the relevance of this income effect has been emphasised in many studies (Hwang et 
al., 1992; Hamermesh, 1999). The results of this study also complement the existing 
evidence on the negative consequences of unemployment and involuntary job displacement 
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on health conditions. Several studies have documented higher rates of mental and stress-
related diseases among unemployed (Paul and Moser 2009; Roelfs et al. 2011) and laid-off 
workers (Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storrie, 2009, 2010; Browning and 
Heinesen, 2012), in addition to higher mortality rates for both groups. Lower levels of job 
safety in new jobs represents an unexplored channel through which displacement may 
negatively affect workers’ health conditions. Moreover, this deterioration of job safety might 
lead to substantial costs that result from an increase in the number of working days lost and 
a (permanent) reduction of workers’ productive capacity. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification 
strategy and econometric methodology. Section 3 describes the data and provides 
descriptive evidence. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Identification Strategy and Estimators 
 
To estimate the effect of displacement (i.e., the treatment) on displaced workers, every 
treated individual “i” is matched to the closest control in terms of the estimated propensity 
score in the same sector “j” by employing a one-to-one nearest-neighbour (NN) matching 
(with replacement) routine. Propensity scores (i.e., the probability of being displaced in 
1997) are estimated separately by industry using the following general specification: 
( )),,()( 19961994,1994,1994,1997, −Φ= iiijij HFCWChntDisplacemeP                        [1] 
where (.)Φ  is the normal cumulative distribution function. The balancing test proposed by 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) is used to check the effectiveness of the matching routine in 
balancing the covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and to determine which interactions 
and higher-order terms to include in (.)jh  (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The argument of (.)jh  
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includes pre-displacement characteristics that may simultaneously affect the outcomes under 
study and the selection into treatment. WCi,1994 represents workers’ pre-displacement 
attributes and job characteristics, such as gender, age, tenure, log of annual earnings, annual 
weeks worked, type of occupation, number of employment relationships held in a year, 
region of birth and region of work. FCi,1994 denotes the industrial sector of the firm and its 
number of employees. Both WCi,1994 and FCi,1994 are computed for 1994 (i.e., three years 
before displacement).1 The set of variables Hi,1994-1996 includes safety-related aspects of a 
workplace2 (i.e., the number of injuries and the number of days on injury leave), an indicator 
of health status (the number of years with a registered episode of sickness leave) and the 
number of episodes of "Cassa integrazione" (which is a subsidy granted to workers 
employed at poor-performing firms in selected industries). The use of a larger time window 
is intended to smooth the rare events on which the proxies are based. 
Although plant closure can be understood as an exogenous shock at the plant level and 
the conditioning set in [1] includes a large number of important job, firm and demographic 
characteristics, the PSM identification assumption of “selection on observables” is rather 
demanding. Therefore, the additional DID procedure is employed to augment the robustness 
of the PSM estimator by differencing away individual unobserved characteristics that are 
constant over time (Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005; Couch and Placzek, 
2010). 
1 In 1995, the impending displacement begins to negatively affect weekly earnings dynamics (evidence is 
available upon request). For this reason, the values of earnings and of the number of weeks worked for 1995 
and 1996 are excluded from the set of control variables. 
2 In principle, pre-displacement injuries might also be already affected by the future firm closure. On the one 
hand, employers might try to cut the costs associated with job safety and/or they could lay off workers and 
leave the remaining employees with more demanding jobs. On the other hand, the fear of being laid off could 
make workers reluctant to report less serious accidents. However, no difference is detected between treated and 
untreated individuals in terms of the average injuries and average days lost because of injuries for each of the 
pre-displacement years 1994-1996. 
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3 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
The analyses in the paper are based on a random sample of full-time workers employed 
in the private sector in Italy with at least three years of tenure at the main job (i.e., the job 
with the highest annual earnings) in 1997.3 The WHIP dataset provides information on 
earnings, employment spells and characteristics of both firms and employees. The INAIL 
dataset contains the number of workplace injuries (i.e., the number of accidents that 
occurred during a work task) and the duration of injury-related leaves at the employer-
employee level. It records all injuries that lead to a leave of more than three days. The 
diagnosis and the prognosis of these accidents are reported and certified by physicians.  
Workers displaced due to firm closure in 1997 are compared to a control group of 
workers that did not experience a mass layoff or a firm closure (or a pre-closure separation) 
during 1997 or subsequent years. The following events are categorised as displacements 
related to firm closure: registered closure of the reference firm,4  absence of a workforce at 
the end of the reference year at the reference firm and separations from closing firms during 
the two years preceding firm closure (i.e., pre-closing separators). Thus, to minimise 
selection problems, workers displaced due to mass layoffs are excluded from the analyses 
whereas pre-closing separators are included in the treated group (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; 
Eliason and Storrie, 2006; Pfann and Hamermesh, 2008).5  
3 Because of its high degree of seasonality, the construction sector is excluded. The energy sector is not 
considered due to the negligible number of treated individuals (three). Because firm closures in the Italian 
public sector are difficult to identify and unlikely to be observed, only transitions from private to public sector 
in the post-1997 period are included.  
4 The algorithm of Contini et al. (2009) has been extended to detect cases of false displacements (Kuhn, 2002) 
by exploring all possible links between workers, firms and job relationships (all three entities have distinct 
identification numbers) in the years preceding and following 1997. 
5 A mass layoff is a reduction in an employer’s workforce that affects at least 30% of the employees in a given 
year. The empirical results are not sensitive to different definitions of pre-closing separators. 
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As in other administrative data, employees who appear as non-employed may have 
found other sources of income via self-employment, quasi-dependent employment (i.e., 
atypical contracts), unemployment benefits or pensions. Following Jacobson et al. (1993), 
we assume zero income and zero injuries for periods of non-employment. Workers who 
were not re-employed after 1997 (19% of displaced workers) are excluded from the baseline 
sample. As a robustness check, these individuals are then included in the analyses. 
Table 1 reports the sample size before matching and various post-matching statistics for 
each sector. For each treated worker, there is a large pool of potential controls (columns 1 
and 2). The lack of overlap does not appear to represent a significant issue in this sample 
(columns 3 and 4).6 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports statistics for the unmatched and matched samples for the pre-
displacement period. After matching on the propensity score, the means of the pre-treatment 
variables look similar for the two groups of workers (columns 1 and 2). This observation is 
confirmed by comparing the standardised bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) before and 
after matching (column 3) and by the results of a standard t-test for the equality of means 
(column 4).7 In the unmatched sample, the value of the standardised bias is high for many 
important covariates (e.g., for tenure, it is approximately 60), and the difference between 
means is often significantly different from zero. However, after implementing the matching 
routine, the majority of these differences is reduced or disappears. 
6 See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a discussion. Those individuals with characteristics that perfectly 
predict success (or failure) in the sector-specific propensity score estimation are excluded from the analysis. As 
a result, only 5% of displaced workers are disregarded. 
7 The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups. When the standardised bias is greater than 35, global linear regression methods are sensitive to 
the specification and are not advisable (Imbens and Rubin, forthcoming). 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4   Results 
This section reports the estimated effects of displacement (in terms of earnings, weeks 
worked, injuries and job instability) and investigates the possible mechanisms that lead 
displaced workers to experience more injuries.   
4.1 Effect of displacement on worked weeks and earnings 
 
Table 3 reports estimates for annual weeks worked, annual earnings and weekly earnings 
in columns 1 to 3, respectively. Earnings are expressed in hundreds of Euros at 1995 prices 
using the Consumer Price Index provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). For 
comparability with other dependent variables (see below), the average annual earnings (i.e., 
the sum of earnings divided by the number of years under consideration) and the average 
annual weeks worked (i.e., the sum of weeks worked divided by the number of years under 
consideration) have been computed for the year of displacement (year 0),8 the entire post-
displacement period (years 1 to 6), the “short-run period” (years 1 to 3) and a more extended 
period (years 4 to 6). Weekly earnings are defined as the sum of earnings during the period 
divided by the corresponding number of weeks worked, which represents the average 
weekly earnings of the considered time window. The pre-displacement baseline measure of 
the PSM-DID estimator is calculated for the 1989-1994 time window (from eight to three 
years before displacement).9   
8 During the year of displacement, estimates are contaminated by the fact that displaced workers are still 
employed in the pre-displacement firm for part of the year, depending on the timing of events. 
9 There is evidence of an Ashenfelter’s dip in weekly earnings for 1995 and 1996 (see also note 1). Therefore, 
these two years are excluded from the base period of the differences. 
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As shown in the first two columns of Table 3, displaced workers experience 
economically and statistically significant losses in terms of average annual weeks worked 
and average annual earnings for the year of displacement (-26% and -21%, respectively) and 
in the three years after displacement (-12% and -15%, respectively).10 In subsequent years, 
these negative effects remain statistically significant but decrease in magnitude by 
approximately half. It is also notable that the magnitude of earnings losses (in percentage 
terms) and their temporal patterns are similar to those for weeks worked. Moreover, there is 
no significant loss in terms of weekly earnings. Thus, consistent with estimates for other 
European countries (Kuhn, 2002; Hijzen et al., 2010), these findings suggest that the bulk of 
earnings losses for re-employed workers is attributable to a decline in time worked rather 
than to losses attributable to reduced wage rates. The absence of weekly earnings losses for 
re-employed workers may be caused by the relatively stringent institutional regulations 
governing wages in Italy and the possibility that workers may exit the labour force in 
response to earnings losses. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The estimates in Table 3 are based on the baseline sample (i.e., workers who were re-
employed at least once in the post-displacement period) and do not account for whether 
workers may have found other sources of income via self-employment, quasi-dependent 
employment (i.e., atypical contracts), unemployment benefits or pensions. Although the 
WHIP dataset does not quantify such monetary compensations, it is possible to estimate the 
effects of displacement on the probability that an individual will fall into one of the above 
10 Earnings losses in percentage terms represent losses of displaced workers (the estimated parameter) as a 
percentage of the mean earnings of the matched control group. The same holds for the other dependent 
variables. 
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states/categories (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).11 In the short term, displaced workers 
have an economically and statistically higher probability of receiving unemployment 
benefits than the matched controls. However, the estimated effects of job displacement on 
the probability of an individual’s falling into one of these categories are not statistically 
and/or economically significant over the long term. Moreover, the difference between the 
treated and matched controls in terms of the probability of their being absent from all 
administrative data at our disposal is equal to 0.13 in the year after displacement and 
gradually decreases to 0.08 six years after displacement.  
Table 4 presents the PSM-DID estimated losses with respect to average annual weeks 
worked and average annual earnings for all displaced workers by assuming zero weeks 
worked and zero earnings for workers who were never re-employed after 1997 (in columns 
1 and 2). In the short term, average annual earnings losses amount to approximately 34% 
and average annual weeks worked decrease by approximately 30%. Because displacement 
increases the probability of receiving unemployment benefits only in the years immediately 
after the loss of a job, the difference between estimated earnings losses and income losses is 
likely to be quantitatively relevant particularly in the short run. In the long term, the 
estimated losses in terms of average annual earnings amount to approximately 26% (20% in 
terms of average annual weeks worked). Overall, this evidence suggests that the bulk of the 
displacement effect on earnings is determined by the difference between the treated and 
controls in terms of the probability of being non-employed. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
11 Table A.1 reports PSM estimates because pre-1997 information on unemployment benefits is not available, 
which makes it impossible to compute PSM-DID estimates. The PSM and PSM-DID results are similar for the 
other dependent variables.  
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4.2 Effect of displacement on workplace injuries 
The effect of displacement on job safety is estimated by analysing two proxies for the 
risk that workers face at their workplaces: the number of injuries reported and the number of 
days that workers are absent from their jobs because of injuries. An injury is a rare event, so 
enlarging the size of the observation window increases the quality of the proxies. To smooth 
these outcomes, the following four time windows are considered: the year of displacement 
(year 0), the entire post-displacement period (years 1 to 6), the first three years after 
displacement (years 1 to 3, or the "short term") and the subsequent three years (years 4 to 6, 
or the "long term"). However, these measures of job risk are limited dependent variables and 
count variables whose analysis is meaningful only if the control and treated groups show the 
same time of exposure to risk (e.g., displaced individuals work fewer weeks than the control 
group). Thus, the two proxies for risk have been normalised by the total number of weeks 
worked during the respective reference periods. The estimated parameters are reported on a 
yearly basis (i.e., the number of injuries and number of days on injury leave per year) to 
improve the readability of the estimates.12 
Table 3 reports the PSM-DID results for the number of injuries per year and the number 
of days on injury leave per year in columns 4 and 5. To proxy the level of job safety before 
displacement, all of the available pre-displacement years (1994-1996) have been used 
together as the base period of the differences.13 In the entire post-displacement period, the 
12 For example, the dependent variable “normalised number of injuries in years 1 to 3” is the sum of the 
injuries registered during the first, second and third years after displacement divided by the number of weeks 
worked in the same time window. To report the estimated parameters on a yearly basis (i.e., in terms of the 
variable “number of injuries per year in years 1 to 3”), the dependent variable described above (i.e., the 
outcome “normalised number of injuries in the years 1 to 3”) is multiplied by 52.14 (i.e., by the notional 
number of working weeks in a year). 
13 The results are not sensitive to restricting the base period of the differences and the covariates used in the 
propensity score specification to the year 1994 (see note 2). 
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estimated effect of job displacement on the number of injuries per year amounts to 0.026, 
which implies a 79% increase in workplace injuries compared to the control group. 
Moreover, the estimates in Table 3 also indicate a 71% increase in workplace injuries over 
the long term (i.e., in the final three post-displacement years), which suggests that the effect 
of displacement on job safety might be relatively long lasting. The results for the number of 
days on injury leave per year provide evidence of a considerable increase in absences 
because of workplace accidents, but only over the long term. The effect of displacement on 
absences in the first three years after displacement is not statistically significant, although it 
is positive and economically relevant. A set of non-reported estimations suggests that the 
probability of normal sickness absences is not affected by displacement (results available 
upon request). 
In principle, the results of Table 3 are uniquely representative of the population of re-
employed displaced workers. However, another interesting policy parameter is the effect of 
dismissal on labour market outcomes if all dismissed individuals find a job. In the worst-
case scenario, re-employment patterns observed in this study might be the result of a self-
selection process in which relatively more risk-averse (and less productive) displaced 
workers leave the workforce permanently. Therefore, as a robustness check, the effects of 
job displacement have been re-estimated for all displaced workers, including those who 
were never re-employed after 1997. These workers are assumed to be so risk averse that 
they would have experienced zero injuries (and zero days on injury leave) had they been re-
employed. Because controls have a relatively low probability to be permanently out of 
employment, the estimated parameters are close to being lower-bound estimates. As 
expected, the estimated effects on injuries and days on injury leave decrease in magnitude 
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(columns 3 and 4 of Table 4); however, they remain statistically significant, and their values 
continue to be relevant. 
Overall, these results indicate that displaced workers experience more job-related 
injuries than their matched controls. Workers may relinquish job safety by accepting more 
hazardous jobs and/or by accepting job instability (i.e., temporary jobs that may be available 
during a period of economic expansion).14 Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, the monthly injury 
hazard rate for all observed job relationships initially increases and peaks three months after 
the beginning of a new job; it decreases thereafter and becomes relatively flat after the 20th 
month. The effect of displacement on job instability (which is proxied by the average annual 
number of new jobs that a worker begins) is high in the short term but decreases 
significantly thereafter (column 6 of Table 3). The (percentage) effect of displacement on 
job instability is approximately 15 times greater during the year in which the firm closes 
down than in the final three years after displacement (years 4 to 6). Nevertheless, the 
(percentage) effect of displacement on injuries per year, which is estimated for the final 
three post-displacement years, remains approximately one-half of that found for the year of 
displacement (and for the first three post-displacement years). Thus, the temporal pattern of 
the estimated effects of displacement on injuries is not consistent with the argument that job 
instability (i.e., workers passing through many temporary jobs and experiencing high injury-
hazard rates at the beginning of every new job) is the main explanatory factor.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
14 During the period under analysis, the performance of the Italian labour market was improving. The 
unemployment rate remained fairly stable at approximately 11.3% during the period 1994-1998 and then 
declined monotonically to 8.7% in 2002. 
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4.3   Discussion and heterogeneity analysis 
A post-displacement increase in workplace injuries might theoretically be explained by 
factors other than the risk imposed by the new work environment but that are otherwise 
connected to workers’ displacement status. Higher risk might also depend on changes in 
attitudes on the supply side (such as less cautious behaviour that results from stress-related 
and psychological illness). Moreover, on the demand side, displaced workers may be 
allocated to the most risky tasks because of stigma effects or the use of screening devices by 
new employers.  
Ideally, a measure of the risk imposed by the working environment may be constructed 
by calculating the likelihood of workplace injury for each firm (using data on injuries from 
the colleagues of individual "i" at individual i’s plant), but this strategy is not feasible 
because the WHIP dataset does not contain information on all workers employed at a single 
firm. However, at a level of greater aggregation, a measure of the risk imposed by the 
working environment may be developed by computing the injury incidence rates in different 
strata defined by relevant observables that predict injury risk. These incidence rates are 
constructed by using injury data for all non-displaced workers during the 1994-2003 period 
and weighting the number of injuries by the number of weeks worked in each strata.15 The 
value of the index calculated for non-displaced workers is then imputed to displaced workers 
belonging to the same cell. The strata used in the construction of the index are defined by 
characteristics at the firm level (industry, size and geographical location) and at the job level 
15 Displaced workers are not considered so that this measure remains independent of other potential factors that 
are different from the risk imposed by the work environment and that are connected to the displacement status. 
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(type of occupation and gender).16 Indeed, within firms belonging to the same sector and 
size class, workers in different occupations (i.e., blue- and white-collar workers) face 
different levels of injury risk. Moreover, within the same occupation, workers of different 
genders are typically assigned different tasks. To detect the variation of workplace risk 
irrespective of the possible learning effect (i.e., high hazard rates in the first months of a job) 
shown in Figure 1, workers’ tenure is excluded from the variables defining the strata.  
Table 5 reports the effect of displacement on the incidence rate in the first column. The 
PSM-DID estimate indicates that displaced workers experience riskier job transitions than 
the matched control group. To assess whether the estimated effect of displacement on 
injuries reflects transitions to more hazardous occupations, the sample of displaced workers 
is divided into two groups according to the riskiness of their transitions. The transitions that 
imply variations in the index (post-displacement minus pre-displacement incidence rates) 
that are greater than the median variation are considered risky. The effect of displacement on 
the number of injuries per week worked is estimated separately for these two groups of 
displaced workers. Table 5 displays the per-year parameter estimates for the two groups in 
columns 2 and 3. Only those displaced workers who make transitions that are riskier show a 
statistically significant effect on the number of job-related injuries. The estimated effect for 
the other group of displaced workers is positive, but the magnitude of the effect is lower and 
not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Although compensation for risk cannot be quantified because of the impossibility to 
observe the full set of non-pecuniary job characteristics and to compare ceteris paribus (e.g., 
16 The sample of non-displaced workers used to calculate the index is comprised of 125,383 workers and 37 
million weeks worked. There are 563 strata, and the median number of weeks worked per strata is 159,309. 
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productivity and tenure) wage and job-safety variations among treated workers, the evidence 
presented in this paper points to the existence of an income effect. If job safety is a normal 
good and if displaced individuals experience a loss of earnings potential (for example, 
because of a loss of firm/industry-specific human capital or of other types of rent), they 
might reasonably be expected to lose in terms of both job safety and wages. The finding that 
re-employed workers on average do not experience wage losses but do lose in terms of job 
safety might be explained by the fact that they earn relatively low pre-displacement wages 
with respect to the entire set of non-displaced workers and because of downward wage 
rigidity.17 On the one hand, the implied average pathway to re-employment for displaced 
workers is a job that is similar to their pre-displacement job in terms of wages but with a 
relatively lower level of job-safety. On the other hand, displaced workers who do not re-
enter the labour market might be those workers who cannot be profitably re-employed in 
any firm because their low productivity level cannot be compensated by any increase in 
injury risk (e.g., because of legal or technological constraints at the firm level).18  
Tables 6 and 7 report the results on the heterogeneity analysis of the effect of 
displacement that were obtained by performing the following regressions: 
itiiiiiti uXXDDYY +++=− βδγ 1994,1994,1994,,                                                                      [2]           
The dependent variables are the variations in weekly earnings and in the injury incidence 
rate with respect to 1994, for each year after 1994. At each post-displacement year, the 
sample of re-employed displaced workers is compared to the corresponding matched 
17 According to Dolado el al. (1996), the minimum wage as a fraction of average earnings in Italy is 0.71, 
which is the highest value across western European countries and the USA during the 1990s. 
18 It is not possible to account for re-employment in the informal sector. Schneider et al. (2000) estimated that 
the Italian shadow economy constitutes 27% of GDP. According to the segmented labour market theory, job 
quality tends to be lower in the underground than in the formal sector. Therefore, displaced workers re-
employed in the informal sector are likely to lose in terms of both wages and job safety. 
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controls. The regressors include a dummy indicating whether an individual is displaced 
(Di=1, 0 otherwise), a set of pre-displacement workers and firms characteristics, Xi,1994, and 
the interaction of the dummy with the set of pre-displacement workers and firms 
characteristics. These variables, which were measured in 1994, include the incidence rate, 
weekly earnings, number of employees, gender (the dummy is equal to one for men), tenure 
and blue-collar job (the dummy is equal to one for blue-collar workers).  
The main message of Tables 6 and 7 is that the pre-displacement wage appears to be the 
most relevant source of treatment effect heterogeneity. Re-employed workers with low pre-
displacement wages face greater effects on job safety and lower effects on weekly earnings. 
This finding is consistent with binding downward wage rigidity; low-wage displaced 
workers who succeed in becoming re-employed must accept riskier jobs because wages 
cannot fully adjust. In addition, displaced workers with safer pre-displacement jobs have, 
ceteris paribus, higher probability to be re-employed in riskier jobs. The same can be said 
for men, who tend to have access to a broader spectrum of risky jobs than women. 
Moreover, it is also interesting to note that men tend to have lower weekly earnings losses 
than women. Finally, type of occupation, age, firm size and tenure are not, ceteris paribus, 
relevant determinants of the heterogeneity of the effects of job displacement.  
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
4.4   Robustness check 
This section analyses the robustness of the previous results to an alternative formulation 
of the propensity score in which the normal distribution is not assumed and to another 
method for the estimation of the effect of displacement on displaced workers. The 
distributional assumption of the error term is relaxed by adopting the semi-nonparametric 
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(SNP) procedure developed by Gallant and Nychka (1987) and subsequently adapted to the 
estimation of binary-choice models by Gabler et al. (1993). This method can approximate a 
broad class of density functions with arbitrary skewness and kurtosis (De Luca, 2008). An 
alternative estimation method based on the conditional independence assumption is the 
propensity score weighting (PSW) estimator (Hirano and Imbens, 2001). With this 
estimation method, a counterfactual for the treated individuals is obtained by weighting the 
untreated observations with the estimated propensity score. The PSW estimator is applied to 
the differenced outcomes, i.e., in the computation of the DID estimator, the observations are 
weighed using the estimated propensity score. As shown by Abadie (2005), the PSW may be 
combined with the DID estimator leading to an even more robust estimator.  
An online supplementary appendix contains the full details of these additional estimation 
strategies and the corresponding estimates.19 The main results of the paper remain 
unchanged.  
5   Conclusions  
The empirical findings of this paper point toward important implications. Although 
transitions to riskier tasks do not necessarily entail the creation of new risks and do not 
necessarily affect welfare in the entire economy (i.e., total accident rates), they may induce a 
more unequal distribution of risk. A policy maker seeking to reduce the disparities between 
treated and control individuals might be interested in devoting more attention to policies 
designed to re-integrate displaced workers into the labour market and policies concerned 
19 This online supplementary appendix also reports the estimated effects of displacement obtained by using: a) 
the PSM technique, b) the OLS estimator, and c) the OLS-DID estimator. The PSM results are similar to the 
PSM-DID estimates presented here, whereas the other two estimators tend to find relatively greater earnings 
losses. 
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with their job safety. For such policy makers, there is a trade-off between the minimisation 
of earnings and employment losses and the level of job safety that such individuals 
experience. 
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Figure 1: Monthly injury hazard rate for pooled flows over the 1994-1999 period. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Composition of the sample by industry. 
Industries Number of 
observations 
before 
matching 
Number of 
displaced workers 
as a percentage of 
the number of 
controls  
(before matching) 
Percentage of 
displaced 
workers 
retained in the 
matched sample 
Average 
weight 
assigned to 
matched 
controls 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1699 2.1 97.1 1.1 
Textile, Apparel and Leather 3809 4.8 96.0 1.1 
Wood, Paper, Printing and Publishing 1895 2.6 97.9 1.0 
Cook, Chemical, Rubber and Plastic 2589 0.9 95.7 1.1 
Non-metallic minerals, Metal and metallic products      5540 1.8 96.9 1.0 
Machines manufacturing (including vehicles) 6995 1.0 94.1 1.0 
Other manufacturing industries 979 2.5 100 1.2 
Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants 6513 3.9 93.1 1.1 
Transport and communications 3312 0.9 82.8 1.1 
Financial intermediation and Business services 6186 1.2 100 1.1 
Other community, social and personal service act. 619 5.1 96.7 1.4 
All industries 40153 2.2 95.3 1.1 
Note: An average weight equal to one means that no control observation has been used more than once. The median 
difference between the propensity score for the treated individuals and that of the matched controls is 0.000026; its 95th 
percentile is 0.0031. These values are very low compared to the estimated probability of displacement. 
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Table 2: Quality of matching 
Variables Sample 1) Mean 2) Mean 3) Standardized 4) p>| t | 
  Treated Control Bias  
Sex  U 0.552 0.713 -33.839 0.000 
 M 0.550 0.578 -5.986 0.249 
Age  U 36.357 39.519 -31.431 0.000 
 M 36.382 36.015 3.654 0.456 
Tenure  U 8.210 10.103 -58.253 0.000 
 M 8.335 8.303 0.990 0.842 
Earnings1994  U 139.912 197.277 -41.885 0.000 
 M 142.902 140.075 2.064 0.623 
Weeks worked1994  U 47.330 49.897 -25.423 0.000 
 M 48.270 48.631 -3.579 0.464 
Weekly earnings1994 U 2.504 3.307 -49.059 0.000 
 M 2.480 2.493 -0.783 0.820 
Average annual earnings1989-1994 U 117.201 175.687 -51.604 0.000 
 M 116.680 112.393 3.783 0.293 
Average annual weeks worked 1989-1994 U 39.623 44.621 -35.037 0.000 
 M 40.521 39.260 8.844 0.154 
Weekly earnings1989-1994 U 2.692 3.424 -45.667 0.000 
 M 2.620 2.612 0.525 0.903 
Dummy Apprentice  U 0.038 0.009 19.027 0.000 
 M 0.037 0.028 5.753 0.329 
Dummy Production Worker  U 0.685 0.550 27.978 0.000 
 M 0.678 0.660 3.857 0.428 
Dummy Basic Non Prod. Worker U 0.262 0.384 -26.354 0.000 
 M 0.269 0.298 -6.406 0.185 
Dummy Adv. Non Prod. Worker U 0.011 0.038 -17.893 0.000 
 M 0.011 0.010 0.806 0.808 
Dummy Manager  U 0.005 0.018 -12.805 0.003 
 M 0.005 0.004 1.161 0.705 
Dummy working in North  U 0.502 0.542 -7.918 0.022 
 M 0.507 0.490 3.470 0.486 
Dummy working in Centre  U 0.298 0.287 2.553 0.459 
 M 0.302 0.306 -0.816 0.871 
Dummy working in South  U 0.199 0.171 7.186 0.033 
 M 0.191 0.204 -3.505 0.492 
Dummy born in North  U 0.426 0.449 -4.788 0.169 
 M 0.432 0.401 6.237 0.207 
Dummy born in Centre  U 0.258 0.256 0.440 0.899 
 M 0.265 0.277 -2.830 0.576 
Dummy born in South  U 0.274 0.262 2.511 0.466 
 M 0.264 0.265 -0.279 0.955 
Dummy born in OECD  U 0.007 0.009 -2.215 0.546 
 M 0.007 0.014 -6.917 0.223 
Dummy born in non-OECD  U 0.033 0.022 7.059 0.023 
 M 0.032 0.043 -6.841 0.240 
Number of jobs1994  U 1.041 1.025 8.625 0.006 
 M 1.038 1.046 -3.963 0.483 
ln(Firm Employees1994 ) U 2.296 5.132 -126.242 0.000 
 M 2.299 2.284 0.625 0.853 
Number of Injuries1994-96  U 0.119 0.118 0.348 0.923 
 M 0.123 0.136 -3.555 0.480 
N. of years with registered sickness leaves 1994-96 U 0.499 0.485 1.696 0.635 
 M 0.507 0.498 1.250 0.801 
N. of days on injury leave1994-96  U 2.000 2.372 -2.856 0.472 
 M 2.032 2.552 -3.990 0.485 
Probability of episodes of  U 0.066 0.087 -7.993 0.030 
"Cassa Integrazione"1994-96  M 0.068 0.059 3.258 0.476 
Note: U=unmatched sample; M=matched sample. These statistics are based on the entire sample of workers observed in the 
year of displacement (see the row “year 0” in Table A.2). The balancing property is satisfied for all the samples of Table A.2. 
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Table 3: The effect of displacement on annual weeks worked, annual earnings, weekly earnings, number of 
injuries, number of days on injury leave and number of new jobs. 
PSM-DID Average  
annual weeks 
worked 
Average  
annual 
earnings 
Weekly 
earnings 
Number of 
injuries  
per year 
Number of  
days on injury 
leave per year 
Average n. of  
new jobs 
per year Time-window 
Year 0 -12.493*** -32.115*** 0.034 
 0.035**  0.573  0.595*** 
(1.110) (4.470) (0.119)  (0.015)   (0.511) (0.025)  
Years 1 to 3 -5.274*** -20.835*** -0.076 
 0.037**  1.346  0.231*** 
(1.297) (5.670) (0.198)  (0.016)   (1.193) (0.022)  
Years 4 to 6 -3.193** -12.656* -0.276 
 0.027*  1.802*  0.105*** 
(1.374) (6.711) (0.204)  (0.016)   (0.977) (0.026)  
Years 1 to 6 -3.973*** -17.698*** -0.086 
 0.026**  0.749  0.177*** 
(1.378) (6.143) (0.183)  (0.011)   (0.708) (0.018)  
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from Propensity Score Matching Difference-in-Differences. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed analytically as in Abadie and Imbens (2011). Sample sizes for each time window 
are described in Table A.2. 
 
Table 4: The effect of displacement on annual weeks worked, annual earnings, 
number of injuries and number of days on injury leave including non-re-
employed  workers (missing observations imputed to zeros). 
PSM-DID Average  
annual weeks  
worked 
Average 
annual 
earnings 
Number of 
injuries  
per year 
Number of  
days on injury 
leave per year Time-window 
Years 1 to 3 
-12.473*** - 47.958*** 0.034** 1.134 
(1.194) (5.869) (0.013) (0.876) 
Years 4 to 6 
-7.114*** - 33.266*** 0.021* 1.552* 
(1.325) (6.632) (0.012) (0.864) 
Years 1 to 6 
-9.793*** - 40.612*** 0.022** 0.672 
(1.201) (6.001) (0.010) (0.494) 
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from Propensity Score 
Matching Difference-in-Differences. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed 
analytically as in Abadie and Imbens (2011). The number of observations used in the analysis 
is indicated in the first row of Table A.2 (Year 0). Indeed, by the sample definition, during the 
year of displacement all individuals are present in the sample for at least one week worked. 
Therefore, the estimates for the year 0 are the same as those presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 5: The effect of displacement on the injury incidence rate and on the number of injuries 
per year for two subgroups (entire post-displacement period: Years 1 to 6). 
 Incidence Rate Risky Transitions Non-risky Transitions 
 PSM-DID  0.003** (0.001) 0.035** (0.016) 0.019 (0.015) 
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from Propensity Score Matching 
Difference-in-Differences. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed analytically as in Abadie and Imbens 
(2011). The temporal average of the incidence rate is calculated as follows: (Sum of the values corresponding to 
each main annual job) / (Number of main annual jobs). The number of the main annual jobs corresponds to the 
number of years that the worker is present in the sample during the considered interval. See the text for the 
definition of the incidence rate. The number of observations used in the analysis is indicated in the last row of 
Table A.2 (Years 1 to 6).  
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Table 6: Heterogeneity analysis of the variations in weekly earnings with respect to year 1994. 
   Years 
Δ Weekly earnings     -2     -1    0      1      2      3     4     5     6 
Treated 0.006 -0.052 0.038 -0.010 -0.067 -0.019 -0.212 0.020 -0.016 
 (no interactions) (0.015) (0.040) (0.069) (0.050) (0.044) (0.064) (0.179) (0.069) (0.062) 
Treated -0.049 -0.380** -0.013 0.279 0.127 0.307 2.052* 0.110 0.175 
 (0.069) (0.189) (0.322) (0.231) (0.209) (0.312) (0.886) (0.352) (0.317) 
Treated*Risk 1994 1.107 -2.363 -0.400 -5.377** -4.149* -3.122 2.208 0.771 -3.075 
 (0.836) (2.291) (3.898) (2.728) (2.450) (3.517) (9.942) (3.801) (3.421) 
Treated*Week. earn. 1994 0.059*** 0.039 -0.015 -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.266*** -0.564*** -0.171*** -0.171* 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.068) (0.057) (0.052) (0.076) (0.226) (0.094) (0.089) 
Treated*firm size 1994 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Treated*male -0.067 0.143 -0.106 0.205 0.249** 0.441** 0.207 0.232 0.389** 
 (0.041) (0.113) (0.193) (0.139) (0.122) (0.176) (0.497) (0.191) (0.171) 
Treated*tenure 0.004 0.022 0.021 0.042*** 0.024 0.005 0.014 0.036 0.020 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.061) (0.023) (0.021) 
Treated*age -0.003** -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.008 -0.015 0.002 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.023) (0.009) (0.008) 
Treated*blue collar 0.016 0.260** -0.155 0.038 -0.013 -0.120 -0.744 -0.215 -0.062 
 (0.045) (0.124) (0.211) (0.152) (0.135) (0.196) (0.553) (0.214) (0.191) 
Male 0.081*** -0.029 0.146 0.261*** 0.259*** 0.210* 0.488 0.362*** 0.390*** 
 (0.029) (0.080) (0.136) (0.095) (0.085) (0.123) (0.346) (0.133) (0.119) 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008** -0.012** 0.005 -0.015** -.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tenure -0.004 -0.026*** -0.017 -0.025** -0.020* -0.007 -0.010 -0.025 -0.013 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.043) (0.016) (0.015) 
Blue collar -0.061 -0.291*** -0.139 -0.335*** -0.326*** -0.307** 0.456 -0.443*** -0.359*** 
 (0.032) (0.088) (0.150) (0.107) (0.095) (0.139) (0.391) (0.152) (0.135) 
Risk 1994 -0.572 1.893 -0.390 0.492 0.308 0.212 -8.891 -1.015 -1.768 
 (0.589) (1.615) (2.744) (1.902) (1.714) (2.488) (7.000) (2.673) (2.376) 
Weekly earnings 1994 -0.047*** -0.041 0.034 -0.024 -0.055 -0.047 0.367** -0.102 -0.084 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.052) (0.039) (0.037) (0.052) (0.161) (0.071) (0.068) 
Firm size 1994 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.002*** .002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.191*** 0.524*** 0.435** 0.670*** 0.916*** 0.930*** -0.903 1.408*** 1.298*** 
  (0.048) (0.133) (0.226) (0.160) (0.146) (0.219) (0.624) (0.252) (0.226) 
Note: The first row reports the effect of job displacement obtained excluding from the explanatory variables the 
interaction terms. Risk 1994 is the injury incidence rate in 1994. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 7: Heterogeneity analysis of the variations in injury incidence rates with respect to year 1994. 
           Years 
Δ Injury incidence rate    -2    -1      0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
Treated 0.000 -0.000 -0.002* 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 
(no interactions) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Treated 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.010** 0.011** 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Treated*Risk 1994 0.026 -0.005 -0.144*** -0.202*** -0.216*** -0.137** -0.137** -0.191*** -0.184** 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.014) (0.049) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) (0.067) (0.071) 
Treated*Week. earn. 1994 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.003* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated*firm size 1994 0.000 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treated*male -0.001 -0.000 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.005 0.006* 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Treated*tenure -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treated*age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treated*blue collar -0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.005** 0.005** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Blue collar 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Risk 1994 -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.046*** -0.111*** -0.125** -0.198*** -0.211*** -0.254*** -0.278*** 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.010) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.049) 
Weekly earnings 1994 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm size 1994 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Note: The first row reports the effect of job displacement obtained excluding from the explanatory variables the 
interaction terms. Risk 1994 is the injury incidence rate in 1994. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1: The effect of displacement on the following probabilities: to retire, to receive Unemployment 
benefits, to receive Mobilitá, to have an Atypical Contract (quasi-dependent employment), to be Self-
Employed, to be an employee and to be non-employed. Means and PSM estimates. 
years  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Retirement T  0.022 0.025 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.037 
Retirement C  0.022 0.024 0.031 0.033 0.037 0.040 0.041 
Diff  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
UB T  0.204 0.125 0.048 0.038 0.027 0.028 0.038 
UB C  0.046 0.051 0.040 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.048 
Diff  0.158 0.074 0.009 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 
Mobilità T  0.099 0.098 0.066 0.033 0.017 0.016 0.017 
Mobilità C  0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Diff  0.098 0.095 0.059 0.027 0.014 0.012 0.014 
Atypical Contracts T  0.014 0.026 0.030 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.037 
Atypical Contracts C  0.012 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.028 
Diff  0.001 0.014 0.015 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.009 
Self-Employment T  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Self-Employment C  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diff  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INPS T  1.000 0.679 0.696 0.681 0.676 0.665 0.652 
INPS C  1.000 0.944 0.863 0.813 0.782 0.759 0.733 
Diff  0.000 -0.265 -0.167 -0.132 -0.106 -0.094 -0.080 
Non-Employment T  0.000 0.171 0.193 0.217 0.223 0.230 0.235 
Non-Employment C  0.000 0.037 0.080 0.116 0.127 0.144 0.155 
Diff  0.000 0.134 0.113 0.100 0.095 0.087 0.080 
Note: Standard errors of PSM are computed analytically as in Abadie and Imbens (2011). The means for the treated (T) and 
control groups (C) are calculated by using the matched sample. The corresponding differences between means (Diff) 
represent the effects of displacement estimated by applying the Propensity Score Matching technique. The differences in bold 
are significant at 0.001 level. The differences in italics are significant at 0.100 level. The other differences are not statistically 
significant. The number of observations used in the analysis is indicated in the first row of Table A.2 (by the sample 
definition, during the year of displacement all individuals are present in the sample for at least one week worked). Mobilità is 
an Italian labour market policy comparable to Unemployment Benefits (UB). The main differences between these two 
policies are the following: 1) eligibility rules  (Mobilità is more selective); 2) the replacement rates (for Mobilità 80% the first 
year and 60% the following years, for UI about 30%); 3) the maximum duration (for UB is six months, for Mobilità between 
one year and four years depending on age). INPS is the probability to be employed in the private or public sector; Non-
employment is the probability to be absent from all the administrative data (i.e., not to be in the states mentioned above). 
Non-employment might include cases of death, emigration and employment in the shadow economy.  
 
 
Table A.2: Number of observations for the samples used in Tables 3-10. 
  All unmatched sample   
Matched 
sample  
Years Treated Non displaced Total Treated Controls Total 
0: year of displacement 848 39305 40153 808 746 1554 
Years 1 to 3 659 37391 38050 624 592 1216 
Years 4 to 6 608 32407 33015 577 542 1119 
Years 1 to 6 687 37515 38202 652 613 1265 
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